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Final Notes on the Discussion of "The Unpopular Prospect of World War III: The 20th Century Is Not Over Yet"
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
See: http://www.americanchronicle.com/authors/view/2885
RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#21)/RE: Umland (JRL 2009-#19)/RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#12) -- see the APPENDIX below.
Dear Mr Ivanov
I have re-read the debate, in "Johnson's Russia List" (JRL), on your blog "The Ivanov Report" and on "Russia: Other Points of View," of my article "The Unpopular Prospect of World War III: The 20th Century Is Not Over Yet." This entire discussion is now documented in an Addendum to "The Russian Nationalism Bulletin", Vol. 3, No. 5(47), 16 March 2009, at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/russian_nationalism/messages/412?threade
Five more notes that refer to your last text at JRL 2009-#21 (see the APPENDIX below) and partly repeat what I have written before:
1. Debating polling numbers is, with regard to foreign policy issues, such as Russian-American relations, only of limited relevance. Foreign affairs are usually conducted by a country's elite, and constitute one of those policy fields least influenced by the broad public. It is the Russian elite's obsession with speculating about the "real" purposes of this or that US policy in Europe or Asia (democracy promotion, missile defence, humanitarian intervention etc.) what constitutes the main problem, and, arguably, could become a threat to international security, in the case of an escalation, on the Caucasus, on Crimea, or in another region.
2. Whereas you had intimated, in your initial critique in JRL 2009-#12, that I am paranoid and a liar, in JRL 2009-#21 (see APPENDIX below), you are now refusing "to engage in a discussion" whether I am "a paranoid liar," and leave "such decisions" to me. You even count me among "[i]ntelligent people." Thanks.
3. Still, in JRL 2009-#21 (see APPENDIX below), you accuse me once more of "cherry-picking" polling data. You quote again the government-controlled VTsIOM agency, and state that "Pew pollsters" have found that only "37%" of Russians had a favourable view of the US "in 2000." I wish you had done neither to spare us the continuation of a bizarre pseudo-debate about, as you ask, whether or not I "have evidence that Pew pollsters were under the Kremlin's 'stricter control'." Was that necessary?
First, I was puzzled indeed because, in my article that you initially criticized, I had quoted the Levada Center's 69% of favourable views of the US by Russians in 2000. How could it be that two reputed polling agencies were reporting two starkly different numbers for Russian public opinion on the US in 2000: 69%, in the case of the Levada Center, and 37%, in the case of Pew?
The solution came only recently when I cared to check the source of your number. The 2000 data that you ascribe to "Pew pollsters" has, apparently, not been collected by Pew in 2000. It is taken from, as Pew's table says, "1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Deparment of State" (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019).
What is important here is less the exact source of the data (I trust the State Department as much as Pew) than the question of when exactly it was collected. I could not find the poll that Pew refers to. But the idea suggests itself that these "37%" of the "1999/2000 survey trends" which you ascribed to the year 2000, is actually data from 1999. In that year, NATO bombed Serbia which, as all polling agencies reported, led to a steep drop of pro-Western feelings among Russians. What was remarkable about this episode in Russian-US relations, however, was not the drop in the first half of 1999, but the fast recovery of pro-Western positions among the Russian population at large, once the bombing had stopped. In distinction to this recovery among the general public of the RF, attitudes towards the US among the Russian elites never fully recovered from their decline in 1999. After several years, Russia's elite seems, by now, to have succeeded impregnating most ordinary Russians with an aversion towards the West, in general, and the US, in particular.
4. Since our debate in January-February 2009, among other articles corroborating my worries, the following analysis has appeared on "Open Democracy" at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/russians-don-t-much-like-th
Although I stand accused of being Russophobic and wanting to hinder a rapprochement between Moscow and Washington (http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/NATO-R
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APPENDIX
Ivanov's rebuttal to my reply to his critique of my article
(see: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20584 , http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=CDI+Russia+Profile+List&a
RE: Umland (JRL 2009-#19)/RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#12)
From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Published in: Johnson's Russia List (JRL) 2009-#21, 30 January 2009
First of all, I'd like to thank Andreas Umland for his thorough comments on my blogpost.
At the core of Umland's response lies his explanation that due to indiscriminate cutting and editing, at the hands of TNI editors, his position has been severely distorted. To restore the truth, Umland has provided us with a fuller version of his article posted to the American Chronicle. He has also suggested that I should have first read this AC version before writing on my blog.
I disagree. I'm not a scholar studying Umland's writings and I'm not obliged to read everything he publishes. I came across the TNI article and commented on what I read there. If Umland believes that his views were misrepresented, he should blame the TNI editorial office, not me.
Besides, and that is a key point, although the AC version of the article is arguably a better piece of literature, both are conceptually similar in claiming that anti-Americanism is rising in Russia; both invoke the same polling data to support that claim. Speaking of polling data, I was somewhat surprised by Umland's confession that polling data were submitted to his TNI article "only after TNI's explicit request." What is that supposed to mean? That Umland originally claimed rising anti-Americanism in Russia without providing any data?
Now, having met "TNI's explicit request" to provide polling numbers and having shared with me a reference to a Levada poll, Umland seems to believe that his job is done. No, it's not. In the center of our discussion is Umland's assertion (articulated in both versions of his article) that "[w]ith the beginning of Vladimir Putin's rise in 1999…Russians' views of the United States were deteriorating continuously." Has Umland supplied us with any reliable data to support this assertion (except for his expert advice to watch, "for a week or two", Russian TV)?
The truth is that no such data exist. Tellingly, Umland dismisses a VCIOM study I mentioned in my post, which was directly contradicting to what he says. Sure, when Umland likes a polling number, he writes that the poll was conducted by "Russia's leading sociological survey agency." When he doesn't like a number, this number was obtained by an agency that "has been put under stricter governmental control." How convenient! (I could understand why VCIOM pollsters would feel pressured to inflate, say, Medvedev/Putin's rating numbers or to downgrade concerns about the economy. But why would they tamper with numbers on U.S. favorability in Russia? Beats me.)
And what about this Pew report (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019), which I also mentioned in my post and which found that over the period of time Umland is talking about, favorable opinions of the United States have actually increased in Russia: from 37% in 2000 to 43% in 2006. Does Umland have any evidence that Pew pollsters were under the Kremlin's "stricter control"?
That's what I call "cherry-picking" polling data: present data that support your position and ignore those that don't.
Absent the data on U.S. favorability, what else does Umland have? Nothing. He frets over the fact that in mid-August 2008, 48% of Russians opined that "[t]he U.S. leadership wants to extend its influence on Russia's neighboring states." This is ridiculous. A political scientist, as he is, Umland must understand the difference between negative views of foreign policy of the Bush administration and negative views of the United States as a country. He's also concerned that many Russians believe that the cold war is still going on. So what? Has he ever heard about a guy named Edward Lucas? Lucas not only believes, too, that the cold war still continues; he's written a book about it. Will Umland accuse Lucas of rampant anti-Americanism?
I'm puzzled with the amount of attention Umland pays to the nature of my relations with Russia Profile. True, occasionally, I contribute to Vladimir Frolov's weekly expert panel, but I have never submitted anything directly to RP. I know that almost every piece of mine that appears in JRL is later re-published by RP. I guess this is because of some, unknown to me, agreement between JRL and RP. Yet I cannot have any responsibility for the format RP uses to reproduce my pieces (even if I cared).
The rest of Umland's comments are noise, a smokescreen aimed at hiding the fact that he has nothing to say on the substance of my critique. I'm obviously not going to discuss the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict: I didn't touch this subject. Nor am I going to engage in a discussion of who Umland should consider himself: a suicidal or a paranoid liar. Intelligent people, and I definitely count Umland as one, must make such decisions by themselves.
Oh, yes, there is one thing Umland and I completely agree upon: I'm indeed cautiously optimistic about the future of U.S.-Russia relations. And yes, I consider talks about a nuclear war between the two countries deliberately provocative.
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For further Russian and Ukrainian comments, see:
http://www.newsland.ru/News/Detail/id/343304/cat/42/
http://www.glavred.com/archive/2009/02/23/182544-1.html
http://blogs.korrespondent.net/celebrities/blog/forum2004/a8634
http://smi.liga.net/articles/IT091046.html
http://www.delfi.ua/news/exclusive/interview/article.php?id=349466&
Debating Armageddon: Reply to My Critics at "Atlantic Community"
Friday, February 27, 2009
(re: http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/NATO-Russia_War%
1. The article "NATO-Russia War: A Possible Scenario" published on "Atlantic Community" (AC) at http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/NATO-Russia_War%
2. Mr. Nikiforov's vitriolic comments on the AC version of the article like Mr. Akishkin's texts on "Atlantic Community" before are valuable in that they illustrate the point of my argument: Western and Russian public opinion on crucial issues in the assessment of the contemporary world have drifted so far apart that a new Cold War seems possible. (Of course, such a new Cold War would be different from the classical one, but, perhaps, not less dangerous. One may also add that the concept of "cold war" is far older than the confrontation of 1945-1987, and goes back to ancient times.)
3. The main problem that I seem to have in communicating, in the West, the viciousness of anti-Westernism in today Russia is, apparently, that many Western international affairs analysts do not know Russian or/and do not watch Russian state-controlled TV. They, perhaps, watch only the English-language "Russia Today" channel the news reporting and analysis of which is different, in tone, style and substance, from the massive political propaganda transmitted around the clock by the major Russian TV channels ORT and RTR. Many Westerners tend to mainly communicate with the doubtlessly existing pro-Western sections of Russia's elite. They pay inordinate attention to such outlets as "Novaia gazeta" or "Ekho Mosky" that, however, reach only limited audiences, in Russia. As a result, these observers have – such is my impression – no full picture of what is today happening in Russian mass media, on a daily basis. For years now, the Western and especially the US political as well as intellectual elites have been portrayed by Russian journalists, pseudo-scholars, pundits etc. as a bunch of scoundrels whose every word needs to be understood as a purposeful lie, and whose only craving is to destroy, rip apart, or, at least, humiliate Russia. I suspect, therefore, that many of my critics would – after two weeks of watching Russian news and political shows at ORT and RTR – more or less agree with my worries about the future of Russian-Western relations.
4. International wars do not necessarily, like in the case of World War II, happen because one or several countries expressly want to go to war, at the outset. As the pre-history of the Crimean War of 1853-1856 (once described as the first "modern" conflict) illustrates, wars can also come about because of an escalation of tensions between countries that, originally, were not planning to fight each other. I am afraid that the beautiful peninsula of Crimea could, in the near future, again become the subject of such an escalation between Russia and the West concerning the sovereignty of Ukraine. For the background, see for instance the analyses by Taras Kuzio of this issue, in his book on Crimea (http://www.amazon.com/Ukraine-Triangle-Conflict-Post-Soviet-Politics/d
5. Obviously, my speculation about World War III was meant to be a provocation. As I see it, I have, however, merely spoken out aloud what, at least, some Russia-watchers who spare the time to watch Russian TV may have been thinking too, for some time now. As Nikolai Berdiaev once wrote, the predictions of a "prophet" (which is, of course, not a term I would like to be associated with) do not necessarily have to come true – they only warn about a possible future.
6. Contrary to the impression that some readers at AC may have gotten, I think NATO bears responsibility for the current problems, in Russian-Western relations. I have outlined my assessment of the decision to preserve and expand NATO a few years ago in German in a review article available at: http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland/Papers/85678/Die-Rezep
I am, obviously, also not a fan of the Bush, Jr. administration and its policies in Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union, as documented, for instance, here: http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_andreas__080403_the_pseudo_iss
7. I am not sure that the frequent economic turn in Western discussions of Russia's interest and policies – above all, of issues in her export of energy – is that helpful. Perhaps, it even reflects a Eurocentric, economistic bias in these commentators' view of the world. My impression during the Russia's last conflicts with Ukraine, Georgia and other countries is that purely commercial considerations play an only limited role in the formation and conduct of Moscow's international behaviour. During the last stand-off with Ukraine, Russia lost apparently millions of dollars and a lot of trust in Central and Eastern Europe. For an adequate explanation for such apparently unconstructive policies, one would seem to need more than economic analysis. See, for instance, the important accounts, in "Eurasia Daily Monitor" (vol. 6, no. 10, 16 January 2008), of Roman Kupchinsky at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34367
I look forward to further comments and rebuttals.
Is Putin’s Russia really “fascist”? A response to Alexander Motyl
Monday, February 23, 2009
In his articles “Is Putin’s Russia fascist?” published on the site of The National Interest Online on December 3, 2007 (http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16258 ) as well as “Surviving Russia’s drift to fascism” published in the Kyiv Post on January 17, 2008 (http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op_ed/28182 ) and on the site of The Henry Jackson Society on January 20, 2008 (http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=493 ), Professor Alexander Motyl of Rutgers University seems to argue that Putin’s Russia can be classified as a fascist state.
Many observers of Russia will be sympathetic to Prof. Motyl’s concern about the decline of democracy in Russia, and unsympathetic to the Kremlin`s policies of the last years. Nevertheless, Motyl`s comment on “Russia`s drift to fascism” appears as unhelpful, if not misleading. Motyl obfuscates the issue of Russian fascism in so far as, indeed, there are representatives of fascism in Russia today. Yet, Putin is not among them.
Motyl is crying wolf too early. By Motyl`s standards, not only Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, but a number of other non-democratic regimes of the 20th century would have to be classified as fascist. In fact, if we would apply Motyl´s loose conceptualization of fascism to contemporary world history, we might find so many “fascisms” that the term would loose much of its heuristic and communicative value.
Most people associate fascism with military conquest, total war and ethnic cleansing. While the Kremlin´s current rhetoric is imperialistic, bellicose and nationalistic, this is still far from amounting to an ideology of revolutionary ultra-nationalism – the most consensual definition of fascism available in international comparative fascist studies today (see, for instance, Fascism Past and Present, West and East: An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right. Stuttgart & Hannover: ibidem-Verlag 2006). To be sure, it would be also wrong to argue – as Russian observers frequently do – that Russian fascism is identical with marginal neo-Nazi groups like Russkoe Natsional´noe Edinstvo (Russian National Unity). Without doubt, Russian fascism, represented by such figures as Vladimir Zhirinovskii or Alexander Dugin, reaches deeply into the mainstream of Russian high politics and public discourse. Yet, neither Zhirinovskii nor Dugin are members of the Russian presidential administration and government. While it cannot be excluded that a person like them might one day enter Moscow`s Kremlin or White House, this has not yet happened.
In this context, Motyl`s comment is in so far unconstructive as he deprives researchers of Russian nationalism of an important analytic tool. If Putin´s administration is fascist: How should one label all those Russian right-wing extremist who complain that its policies are still too liberal and pro-Western? If Russia is already fascist: What is the whole fuss about “Weimar Russia”? The Weimar Republic was, in its early phase, an unstable and unconsolidated, and its last years a declining and subverted democracy. But it was not fascist. While most researchers agree that the Weimar Republic was, after the World Economic Crisis, destined to collapse, it was until January 1933 unclear where this collapse would lead.
In Russia too, the outcome of Putin`s gradual destruction of democracy is still open. A regime inspired by fascist ideology is one of Russia´s, but, perhaps, not her most likely future. In assessing Russia´s fate today and in the next years, we should reserve the label “fascist” for only those scenarios that indeed deserve this most value-laden term of the 20th century.
17th January 2008
Will Medvedev (Be Allowed to) Initiate a Second Perestroika? Addendum to the Discussion of a Possible "Second Coming of Gorbachev" at "Russia Profile"
Monday, February 23, 2009
I am flattered that Vladimir Frolov took my recent article "Gorbachev Number Two: Dmitry Medevdev" (www.americanchronicle.com/articles/60459 ) as a starting point for a discussion of the prospects that Medvedev´s rise may or may not offer for Russia and Russian-Western relations, in the "Weekly Experts Panel: The Second Coming of Gorbachev?" on "Russia Profile," May 13th, 2008 (available at http://opednews.com/maxwrite/diarypage.php?did=7393 ).
There are many points that I could and some which I will make below concerning Eric Kraus´s, Anthony T. Salvia´s and Stephen Blank´s various rejoinders concerning an interpretation of Medvedev as a second Gorbachev, and Frolov´s introduction. At once, a clarification needs to be made concerning Blank´s seemingly sensible suggestion that "[w]e need to judge Medvedev by what he does." Hardly anybody will disagree. Yet, ex post judgments are not always the purpose of academic or journalistic investigations. We get our money not only for assessing what happened, in the past (many people could do that). One reason that modern societies afford themselves professors, pundits or other analysts is that people want to know what may happen, in the future. It was, perhaps, because I proposed in my article a relatively clear vision of Russia´s future that Frolov decided to use my piece to kick off a discussion. While the commentators found much to criticize in the view (not necessarily only mine) of Medvedev as a possible reformer, they did not develop lucid alternative future scenarios. This is doubly convenient: It looks more sober than the speculative predictions that I offered. And it is less risky: Not taking a definite position spares one from, or makes it easier, defending it.
Here come my comments to the Russia Profile expert panel "The Second Coming of Gorbachev?"
First, Frolov introduces the discussion by asserting that "many Western analysts" have entertained the hypothesis "that Medvedev´s presidency will usher in a more liberal period in Russia´s political development." My impression has been different, so far. While all Western observers I have read agree that Medvedev was the best pick among the candidates available in Putin´s entourage, few have been as enthusiastic about Medvedev as me. Instead, many have portrayed Medvedev as an opportunist, if not as a mere puppet of Putin.
Also Frolov mentions that observers focused on the facts that Medvedev is young and has no communist background or known KGB past. While this has been indeed mentioned in numerous of the more optimistic comments on Medvedev, these aspects were not the foci of my argument. I do not consider such affiliations or non-affiliations per se as important. Many of the most radical reformers and staunch liberals in the post-communist world where once communist party members; some even had party apparatus jobs before turning into reformers. Even a KGB background as such does not necessarily imply that the person in question has low respect for democracy. Not only Vladimir Putin, but also Oleg Kalugin, Alexander Litvinenko and others critical of Russia´s return to authoritarianism were once KGB officers.
Further, Frolov´s evaluation that "political and media freedoms […] have been somewhat limited under Putin" is a misleading understatement. There are, in Russia, still some critical media outlets such as Novaya gazeta, Ekho Moskvy as well as a whole number of informative websites. But they exist not because the Constitution gives them the right to do so, but because Putin & Co. have decided that taking control of them or shutting them down would be more costly than letting them serve their limited audiences. If pluralistic outlets such as the above developed into true mass media, they would start getting telephone calls from their stock holders, or visits from the tax police, fireworks department, or other governmental offices. The reason that Russians, for instance, cannot watch any longer, on their major TV channels, the once popular political shows of such journalists as Evgenii Kiselev, Leonid Parfenov (whose historical programs, to be sure, are still on air) or Savik Shuster is not because these men are dull commentators whom nobody wants to see. Rather, Kiselev, Parfenov or Shuster are smart, articulate and independent-minded professionals with the capacity to gather mass audiences, on TV. Talent is not something that in Putin´s new Russia would be sufficient to make a career in a field linked, in one way or another, to politics.
Frolov is also somewhat confusing when he talks about "checks and balances already installed by Putin." While one may argue that Putin has indeed put "checks and balances" on Medvedev´s freedom to move, this particular terminological construct is – I assume, Frolov knows – usually applied in descriptions of democratic polities where the different branches of power are kept in an approximate equilibrium and relative independence from each other so as to prevent usurpation of prerogatives by one of them. Even many Russian fans of Putin would today, probably, admit that there are no real "checks and balances" left in Russia´s political system. And some might add that Russia does not need them because she is a different country with her own peculiar traditions.
Second, when Eric Kraus calls it "touchingly naïve" to speculate about the possibility of a re-democratization of Russia, I would return the compliment. In the mid-1980s, Oxford´s Archie Brown and some others were identifying Gorbachev as a reformer. The idea that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU could be presiding over the dismantling of key elements of the Soviet system seemed to many observers, at that time, far-fetched, to put it mildly. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl went furthest, and compared Gorbachev to Joseph Goebbels. (A couple of years later one could observe Kohl and the "Russian Goebbels," though, walking together in wool cardigans through an idyllic landscape in the Caucasus.)
Further, Kraus´s affirmative assessment of recent Russian affairs, and, in particular, his statement concerning Russia´s "increasingly well-articulated policy" under Putin would be questioned by many. In my view, it has, instead, become increasingly unclear where Putin wants Russia to go. For instance, within his eight years of rule, Putin managed to build two "special relationships" with Britain: a friendly one, at the beginning of this presidency, and an adversarial one, more recently. Even more disturbing has been the Russian leaderships frequent switches between xenophilia and xenophobia, and the various repercussion of its instrumentalization of ethnic stereotypes concerning Balts, Georgians, Ukrainians, Americans, and Westerners, in general. I have, in an article on Russia´s rapidly rising nationalism, opined that, if one extrapolates Russia´s development during the last eight years into the future, the Russians will become "a lonely people and Moscow an isolated international actor, in the new century."
Finally, in his defence of authoritarianism, Kraus considers Russia as a "developing country." Probably, this would not find many supporters even among those Russians who might otherwise support Kraus´s apologetic assessment of Putinism. If he had been in Russia in 1999-2000 (as I was), Kraus could have witnessed a paradoxical situation: relatively high political pluralism and mass media freedom, and an economy that was just starting off, in this "developing country," at the same time.
Anthony T. Salvia´s following critique is far more serious and interesting: He does not regard the parallel between Gorbachev and Medvedev convincing because the situations in which these two politicians found themselves when becoming the official leaders of their countries are different. I agree with this critique, and would admit that this was an aspect that I did not, and could or even should have touched upon in my article. The one qualification that I made was that my predictions only apply, if Medvedev retains sufficient powers in the presidential office, and does not become a mere figure-head President. If the gravity of power travels with Putin from the Kremlin to the White House, on the Moskva, then obviously there will be no second perestroika.
To this qualification, and here Salvia makes an important addition, one needs to add that Gorbachev came into office when the country and its ideology were both, at least among the intellectual and political elites, perceived to be already in crisis. Neither of these two conditions applies to today´s Russia. Still, Gorbachev´s democratic inclinations proved to be strong in 1989-1991 when he was reacting to society´s push for ever more freedoms rather than acting himself as a liberalizer. My suspicion is thus that Gorbachev would have, much like Alexander Dubcek before him, attempted to initiate liberalization and democratization even without a looming crisis (though he may not have risen as far as he did without such a crisis - doubtlessly, a major factor in his promotion to General Secretary).
In another article called "The Two Towers of Future Russia" (www.americanchronicle.com/articles/61377 ), I argued that the emergence of a pro-Western "tower" around Medvedev, in the Kremlin, will lead to a counter-reaction and the emergence an anti-Western "tower" within some other Russian institution. While there are certain parallels between Medvedev´s and Gorbachev´s relative positions in Russia´s ideological spectrum and political history, it is to me thus unclear what exact results Medvedev´s probable attempts to liberalize the Russian polity will have. In view of the impending consolidation of various sections of the nationalist spectrum in Russian politics against Medvedev, a second "perestroika" is only one of the possible outcomes, perhaps, not even the most likely one. Salvia´s scepticism concerning Medvedev´s capacity to implement democratic reforms is justified. In the worst case, Medvedev´s "home-range" will be circumscribed to such an extent that he will not even be given the chance to initiate changes. Yet, this would be substantially equivalent to depriving the office of the President of the Russian Federation of its hitherto defined prerogatives – a caveat I mentioned in my initial comparison of Medvedev with Gorbachev.
Finally, Professor Blank speaks of "speculation and wishful thinking" with regard to the argument about Medvedev as a possible reformer. I should remark that I, at least, never proposed that the fact, mentioned in Blank´s critique, that Medvedev´s parents are professors is of any importance as such (as I did not present Medvedev´s lack of links to the CPSU or KGB as being per se reliable indicators). In distinction to Frolov, I also did not focus solely on pro-democratic quotes by Medvedev though I did collect – and here Blank would be right – some of the new President´s more remarkable statements on "sovereign democracy," Russia´s position vis-à-vis the US, or the future of European-Russian relations. However, I argued that it is a combined consideration of such statements (of which there are many), Medvedev´s brief engagement in Russia´s emerging democratic movement in late 1988 - early 1989, and some facts of his biography that allows one to see him as a potential reformer.
When Blank writes that "Umland´s analysis is already off the mark, because the government apparatus is brought under Putin´s control without any apparent sign of protest from Medvedev," I am not sure to which part of my article Blank refers. If I were Medvedev´s advisor, I would tell him not to protest anything that Putin does. I would further advise the President to wait for a year or two, if not longer, with attempts to re-democratize Russia in the same way in which Gorbachev, after becoming General Secretary in 1985, waited for about two more years before he made clear that when he says "glasnost´" he actually means it (Brezhnev had used the word too). I think that Blank´s assertion that "[t]he stories about [Medvedev´s] alleged liberalism recall the old KGB line that Andropov was a secret or closet Westernizer and reformer, and smack of the same provenance given the competent organs' belief that many Westerners, including seasoned analysts and politicians, are gullible enough to believe anything coming out of Moscow" is so much off the mark that it does not warrant further discussion.
The Paranoia Card: A Comment on Tsygankov's "The Russophobia Card"
Monday, February 23, 2009
I think that Andrei Tsygankov's article on American Russophobia in "The St. Petersburg Times" of April 4th, 2008 (http://sptimes.ru/story/25566 ) is a rather useful illustration of how current US rhetoric on Russia can be perceived. It would be especially helpful, if this article were reprinted in a major US outlet. Yet, there are, at least, three additions that need to be made to Tsygankov´s argument:
First, US "anti-Russian" rhetoric is not that particular. One can hear similar voices in both Western and Eastern Europe. Tsygankov reproduces here a common Russian allegation that the West's current "anti-Russianness" is a sole result of Russia's recent "resurgence" as an international economic and political factor, or even a pathological reaction to Russia's purported "rebirth" as an independent nation under Putin. However, as Tsygankov should know, much of the more competent criticism of current Russia comes from people who not only know and study, but actually like or even love the Russian people, culture and customs - not to mention the various Russians and half-Russians among the critics.
What Tsygankov seems to allege is what one often hears inside Russia too: If you criticize Putin, you are a "Russophobe". And if you are in favour of his policies, you are a "patriot". Tsygankov apparently applies a similar logic: Criticism of Putin's dismantling of democracy is emotional and unhelpful. Ignoring such developments is sober and constructive. Yet, I am afraid, some of those less critical of, or vocal on, recent Russian domestic political developments, simply don't care about Russia and are certainly no "Russophiles". They just want to do business as usual, and Russia to deliver oil, gas etc. in time.
Second, Russia itself has created much of - what one may call - the institutional background of Western criticism of her internal developments. She has entered the Council of Europe, and transformed the G7 into the G8. She is a prominent member of the OSCE, and engages with NATO in a special Council. The fundamental basis of all of these organizations are, however, those principles which Putin has violated repeatedly in recent years. Moreover, the Russian political elite is mocking Western values by making up concepts like "sovereign democracy" - a "democracy" based on half-democratic procedures, pseudo-pluralism, subverted checks and balances, a government-manipulated civil society, etc. If, as Tsygankov seems to think, "Russophobia" is the major problem in Russian-Western relations, then Russia should leave the above organizations. This would immediately cool down Western criticism of Russia. If Russia were an international actor similar to China, Brussels and Washington would treat Moscow like Beijing - a state different from ours, but one has to do business with and should thus leave alone regarding its domestic matters.
Third, certainly, Western criticism of Russia has become harsh recently, and is, I agree with Tsygankov, sometimes ridiculously incompetent. Yet, this still does not compare to what Russia's most influential political commentators today publicly opine about the United States and NATO, on a daily basis. Whoever knows Russian and had the chance to watch Russian TV for a couple of days may agree that Russian views on Western foreign policies, in general, and the US´s role in the world, in particular, are nothing less than paranoid. The bizarre conspiracy theorizing that has taken hold of Russian public opinion nowadays goes far beyond Western "Russophobia". The West is not simply criticized, but made responsible for many of the mishaps of recent Russian and world history. In its daily portrayal in Russian mass media, the US political elite comes across as a bunch of scoundrels whose every word on Western intentions in international affairs needs to be seen as a purposeful lie.
Much of what Putin has recently done to Russia´s political institutions is justified by this kind of discourse: Russia needs to protect itself from various foreign agents, national traitors, and Western spies. An open political system is not something that Russians can afford in conditions of massive Western attempts to subvert the nation´s independence and uniqueness. In the opinion of people like Gleb Pavlovskii, Mikhail Leontev, Alexander Dugin and many other prominent commentators, Russia is fighting a hidden war with the West, and, therefore, needs to become a fortress within which democratic niceties are dangerous luxury. The core of current Western-Russian misunderstandings lies at least as much in this kind of views as in Western "Russophobia".
In the unlikely case that Russia becomes a truly democratic country, much of what Tsygankov laments in his article would simply disappear.
Suicidal Notes from a Paranoid Liar: A Response to Eugene Ivanov’s "(F)lying Numbers"
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
In a recent blog (http://theivanovosti.typepad.com/the_ivanov_report/2009/01/umland.html ), Eugene Ivanov accused me of cooking up statistics in order to give an inadequate impression on Russians’ views of America, in my article "The Past Is Present" published by The National Interest Online on January 16, 2009 (http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20584 ). The contents and tone of Ivanov’s critique led me first to ignore this statement. However, as I have learned, Ivanov’s article was reposted at the CDI List section of Russia Profile (http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=CDI+Russia+Profile+List&a
First, the basic misunderstanding: As I have already clarified with Ivanov in a brief exchange on his blog (http://theivanovosti.typepad.com/the_ivanov_report/2009/01/umland.html
These unfortunate circumstances lead to a number of misunderstandings in Ivanov’s interpretation of my argument. The confusion starts with a minor misrepresentation on my, in Ivanov’s words, "impressive opening paragraph" about the future of Russia which, in the original text, was not the opening paragraph (the first two paragraphs had been instead devoted to the professional risks, for an academic, to talk publicly about World War III; see the above site at the American Chronicle). It ends with a more consequential and principally false presentation of the gist of the article, as well as with Ivanov’s entire critique heading in a direction different from that of my original article.
In my original text, the argument was less about the polling numbers (submitted only after TNI’s explicit request) than about the current Russian elite discourse as expressed in political debates, academic conferences, TV talk shows, newspaper articles, etc. It was about what is and what is not said, what is regarded as politically correct and incorrect, what is permissible and impermissible to voice openly in Russia today. This – and not epiphenomal public opinion on foreign affairs the conduct of which is principally shaped by elites, anyway – is the main problem. If the trends of the last eight years, in this particular regard, continue in the future, the increasingly anti-American talk of Russia’s political and intellectual leaders could, become a, if not the major headache for humanity, again.
Ivanov writes that "Umland seems to like the word ‘paranoia’." Whoever knows Russian and had the opportunity to watch, for a week or so, the foreign affairs reporting of the two main Russian TV stations ORT and RTR might also start to "like the word ‘paranoia’." Because that is exactly what Russia’s politicians, journalists, pseudo-scholars, and other public figures are cultivating, on a daily basis, in Russian mass media today. Thus, Vladimir Putin’s recent assessment that the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has been instigated by the Bush administration has raised only few eyebrows, in Russia. Who else than the amerikantsy could be behind the costly confrontation between the two Slavic brother-nations? Many Russian opinion makers seem to think that the more unpleasant an international (and, sometimes, even national) event is for Russia, the more likely it is that the US is somehow behind it. Scores of Russian intellectuals and politicians appear to actually "need" America for the definition of their homeland: Russia is what the US not is, and the US is what Russia is not. The longer these intellectuals and politicians will have access to Russian mass media the deeper such views will sink into Russian discourse already heavily contaminated with xenophobia and conspirology. My prediction is, therefore, that – should Putin continue to shape Moscow’s information policies – Russian popular anti-Americanism will grow further, in the future. Whereas Western and Central European views of the US will, after the end of the Bush, Jr. Administration, significantly and lastingly improve, the "Obama effect" may be only brief, in Russia.
This failure of Ivanov’s critique is based on a principal misunderstanding that can be explained by the cuts that TNI made in my article without my approval. It can be also understood in view of the fact that, like many other Russia watchers, Ivanov continues to be cautiously optimistic about the future of Russian-American relations. I wish that Ivanov and Co. will turn out to be right, and that pessimists, like myself, will be proven wrong.
What was, however, unexplainable to me were Ivanov’s insinuations about me dreaming up polling numbers, and his speculations about my agenda. Ivanov ridicules repeatedly my mentioning of a possibility of an armed confrontation between the US and Russia – something that, I assume, many will sympathize with. However, he then concludes his statement with the assumption that "Umland does not want the improvement in U.S.-Russia relations to take place." As a result, I would appear to be suicidal: I seemingly want World War III to happen sooner rather than later.
Most disconcertingly, Ivanov goes on and on about my "(f)lying numbers" – that I am "invoking" polling data, that it "is a mystery what is so magic about these numbers," that I "pick and interpret" my numbers, that "it is not clear which of the Levada polls this number, 43 percent, came from," that, "like many other Russia ‘experts’," I do "not have a habit of referencing the polling data" I am referring to," that this gives me "an opportunity to creatively interpret cherry-picked numbers," etc. and that Ivanov "thus had to do [his] own research."
I mentioned, at the outset of the paragraph on the polling data, the Levada Center as my source. What I indeed did not mention was that the WWW address of the homepage of the Levada Center is www.levada.ru . I also did not mention that the site where I got most of my data on Russian attitudes towards the United States is the Levada Center’s site which is devoted to Russian attitudes towards the United States. I also did not mention the WWW address of the Levada Center’s site on Russian attitudes towards the United States which is www.levada.ru/russia.html . This site, like seemingly most sites of the Levada Center, is not closed or secret, but freely available (or, at least, it still was so on the evening of January 26, 2009). I used also other sites on the Levada Center’s homepage the exact addresses of which I also did not mention. Sorry.
By the way: Readers of Ivanov’s article on Russia Profile may detect an unintended irony of Ivanov’s tirade: The Russia Profile version of Ivanov’s article also does not give any references to the sites he quotes from. Ivanov too would thus seem to belong to those "Russia ‘experts’" who, in his words, do "not have a habit of referencing the polling data" they use. This impression arises because Russia Profile did not reproduce the author’s original text version, in its entirety (i.e. with the hyperlinks). Sounds familiar?
A particular nuisance was that Ivanov – after doing his "own research" – intimated that I may have simply made up the number of 43% for the Russian approval ratings for the US, in July 2008. He also wrote that there was a "more than 20 percent (from 64 to 43) drop in favorability that, according to Umland, had occurred between 2007 and July 2008." The 43% for positive views on the US in July 2008 was from the mentioned site of the Levada Center on Russian attitudes on the US at http://www.levada.ru/russia.html (on the top of the site, in the first row of the uppermost table, in the right column, in black colour). In the article to which Ivanov refers, I mention, contrary to the impression that Ivanov gives, neither the number 64 nor the year 2007, anywhere.
As the source of my numbers from the Levada Center remained unclear to Ivanov, he recommended, as an addition or alternative, 2003 and 2008 polling data from VTsIOM to disprove the allegedly "‘rising’ anti-Americanism in Russia." However, those among us a bit familiar with Russian social sciences know that VTsIOM has been put under stricter governmental control since Putin's rise – this circumstance being the major reason for the emergence of the Levada Center that employs many former VTsIOM researchers. Unsurprisingly, VTsIOM has, since the change of much of its personnel and since becoming closer to government, been accused of framing polls. Like other observers of Russia, I have, therefore, stopped using VTsIOM data. Ivanov’s quote illustrates why: According to the VTsIOM data cited by Ivanov, between 2003 and 2008 Russian negative attitudes towards the US declined from 40% to 29% (http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10432.html?no_
In general, I did not comprehend what Ivanov wanted to communicate with his denigrating critique, and why he was so eager to present me as a manipulator and liar whom he, moreover, suspects of being paranoid. Ivanov has a Ph.D. and written enlightening articles on his blog. However, in his attack on my article, he descends to the level of the likes of the authors behind La Russophobe, contributors to the eXile, bloggers at inoSMI.ru, and similar commentators who use the WWW to spread venom, and who regularly honour political analysts with their unkind attention, yet are usually not, as Ivanov in this case, published in outlets like Russia Profile. I hope that this kind of discussion style is not going to become the standard of how the members of our community will, in the future, struggle for the best interpretation and assessment of current events in Russia.